Martin Suchanek, GAM Infomail 1226, June 26
Almost as quickly as the scare had begun, it was over. On June 23, the head and owner of the Russian paramilitary group Wagner, Prigozhin, announced a “March for Justice” on Moscow. Even though it was said that it was not directed directly against Putin, but “only” against Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, a coup was looming.
The Wagner Group mobilised up to 25,000 soldiers. Within a few hours, it occupied the military command posts in Rostov/Don, the army’s command centre in the Ukraine war, and advanced on Moscow.
Putin declared the Wagner troops “traitors” and threatened by all possible means to stop and punish them. Prigozhin, for his part, announced that he would destroy all those who stood in the way of a mercenary.
About 200 kilometers from the capital, the advance ended as unexpectedly as it had begun – with the retreat of Wagner’s troops. This end was mediated by the President of Belarus, Aliaksandr Lukashenka. There was no major armed confrontation. The charges against Prigozhin were dropped, the “insurgents” were pardoned. After all, they had done “great things” for Russia in Ukraine, Syria, Mali and other slaughterhouses.
Conflict in the regime
The coup, which was as surprising as it was surprisingly aborted, not only caught Putin on the wrong foot. The entire world public speculated, repeatedly new “news” announcements, insider information and conflicting “experts” with their assessments. The American secret service had supposedly been informed in advance, it was said. Others thought that the Russian one also knew something. Some spoke of an attempted coup, others said it was more of a staged confrontation. And, like the beginning, the end of the “March for Justice” gave, and still gives, room for speculation.
The fact is that the episode represents the zenith of a conflict between two wings of the Russian imperialist military apparatus and regime. For months, Prigozhin had accused the heads of the army of failing in Ukraine, glossing over the situation, not being brutal enough and withholding supplies from his fighters. In addition, the army was said to have mined the withdrawal routes of Wagner soldiers from Bakhmut. On June 23, Prigozhin accused the Ministry of Defence of launching an attack on his troops.
Undoubtedly, the whole conflict shows an internal weakness of the Russian regime. The deployment, the passivity of sections of the army, the loss, albeit temporary, of control over parts of the country are, of course, a sign of weakness for any regime, especially for a Bonapartist one, so much tailored to the “omnipotence” of one man.
This does not require any special knowledge. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the conflict has not been resolved, but only pacified. It is therefore likely to continue between the army leadership and the Wagner Group.
And even if Putin allegedly tried to settle it months ago through mediation, it must not be forgotten that he himself is a spawn of the system in several respects.
Origin and change of the Wagner Group
For years, Russian imperialism has built up private, paramilitary “security forces” closely linked to the regime. The Wagner Group is certainly the best known, but by no means the only one. For years, they fulfilled important functions for Russia’s foreign policy, doing the particularly barbaric dirty work “privately”, so that Putin and the army did not take responsibility for these “excesses”, and could even distance themselves from them if necessary.
For years, the Wagner Group, among others, operated on the fringes of Russian legality. Ironically, its current intimate enemy, Gerasimov, was one of the inspirers of its founding. Prigozhin himself denied any ties to this organisation until 2019.
The Wagner group itself was and still is recruited primarily from former soldiers and officers of the Russian army. Even if it has no official ideology, it was characterised from the beginning by racist-nationalist forces including open fascists. The name Gruppe Wagner goes back to the former Lieutenant Colonel Dmitri Uktin, who himself commanded a sub-unit of the private mercenary group the Slavic Corps and used the combat name Wagner there. Uktin himself was an admirer not only of the German composer, but also of Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich. Even if the Wagner Group as a whole is not a fascist organisation, Russian right-wingers have been active in it since its founding.
In the wake of the Ukraine war, however, the size and role of the mercenary force changed. Increasingly, poorly trained soldiers as well as criminals were taken in in large numbers, often as cannon fodder among the “troops” themselves. According to various sources, the total number of fighters in the Ukraine war is estimated at 30,000 to 50,000 men.
Putin as a midwife
With its rapid growth, the position in the Putin system also changed and the competition with the military apparatus, which had originally inspired its creation, also increased. The losses in the Ukraine war exacerbated these contrasts.
It would, however, be short-sighted to regard these internal contradictions among the armed forces of Russian imperialism only as conflicts between individuals or institutions. Putin’s Bonapartist system of rule has long fuelled conflicts and competition among his followers. This even works as long as they do not go beyond a certain level. Putin can then act as the “neutral”, “reasonable” arbitrator and thus prove himself as an irreplaceable guarantor of stability not only for his followers, but also for the population.
But these conflicts have developed a dangerous momentum of their own in the Ukraine war, which got out of hand for some on June 23 and – ultimately contrary to the intention of all those involved – also made the system of rule of Russian imperialism appear weak.
The fact that the coup attempt ended bloodlessly not only gives it an unintentionally comedic touch. The outcome also makes it clear that, in the end, all those involved do not want to replace the Putin system, but only want to maintain their position in it. However, it was damaged.
The action of the Wagner Group makes it clear that sections of the armed apparatus as well as the economic elite are also beginning to think about alternatives to Putin – including those who may pursue an even more barbaric course. Secondly, it points to a deep-seated discontent among soldiers at the front, which poses a danger to any regime. For the war in Ukraine, this does not mean an easing of tensions on the Russian side. In the short term, it is quite likely that the war effort of Russian imperialism will be intensified in order to maintain its own conquests against the Ukrainian counterattacks. The Putin regime depends even more on this today than it did before the “Wagner” coup.