On December 2nd Hugo Chávez received his first defeat at the polls since his election in 1998, in vote on proposed reforms to the 1999 Bolivarian constitution. Chávez had promised the amendments would “deepen the roots of the revolution” and entrench “popular power”.
His proposals were rejected by 49.3% to 50.7%, with a 45% abstention rate.
This defeat was greeted with dismay by the large numbers of Venezuelans massed behind Chávez and his “Bolivarian socialist revolution,” and it will certainly encourage the Right, already celebrating on the streets. It will be warmly welcomed in the White House too. It could well be used as a launching pad to destabilise Venezuela and even launch a coup against Chávez. But this defeat is largely one of Chávez’ own making. It is defeat for his populist and Bonapartist methods and can only be countered by the methods of the class struggle.
Why was Chávez use of the referendum and constitutional amendments a false one which courted defeat? Firstly Chávez threw together in his proposed amendments some positive albeit limited reforms- one which could be supported – with undemocratic measures which strengthened the still capitalist Venezuelan state and could thus not be supported.
What was in the constitution?
The positive measures promised social security to those who work in the informal sector (50% of Venezuela’s workforce), outlawed sexual discrimination on the basis of gender or sexual orientation, enshrined the results of previous land reforms promising “the abolishment of latifundia”, enacted a 36 hour week and made free university education a right for all. In addition the amendments sought to lower the voting age to 16 and recognised the creation of “communal councils,” allocating 5% of the annual national budget to these grass roots bodies.
All these revolutionaries could critically support. Our criticisms are their modesty, the fact that they do not abolish the 1999 constitution’s protection of private ownership of the land, the factories, the banks, the media etc.
But the package of amendments also sought to strengthen the powers of the presidency. The proposal to lengthen the presidential term from 6 to 7 years and greatly increase his powers during a state of emergency could not be supported.. The right to due legal process for those arrested during it was removed, as was the guaranteed right to freedom of information, and the time limit of 180 days.
In short these changes increase the already considerable authority of the presidency. Obviously the argument put forward by Chávez and his followers is that these measures would only have been used against the Right, against any coup by the old oligarchy, sponsored by US imperialism. But what if Chávez were to be assassinated, himself turn to the right, or replaced in a palace coup by some one like General Isaías Baduel, his former Minister of Defence who played a prominent role in defeating the 2002 attempted coup but has now turned to the right? Then these draconian powers could all be used against the working class.
Leon Trotsky, a figure Chávez has praised and quoted, once said (with regard to the calls to strengthen the state “against fascism”)
“…we must vote against all measures that strengthen the capitalist-bonapartist state, even those measures which may for the moment cause temporary unpleasantness for the fascists.”
The presidency – no matter who occupies it – remains an institution of the bourgeois state which be it said revolutionaries are in favour of totally abolishing not strengthening.
Abstention
Most of the left, including the majority in the independent and militant union federation the UNT, carried away by Chávez’s populist rhetoric, supported a yes vote in the referendum. An exception was Orlando Chirino, a national co-ordinator the UNT, who called for an abstention. This was, in the view of the League for the Fifth International, a correct position to take.
Despite Chávez radical rhetoric, the profound economic inequalities in Venezuelan society have persisted. In the rural sector it’s a similar story: despite promises to redistribute land, the reforms have been limited to expropriating “unproductive” land. Meanwhile, landless rural workers who occupy land without government backing have been threatened with jail.
Furthermore, the government is proposing to politicise the military without fundamentally reforming its bourgeois character. The army high command, ultimately loyal to capitalism, even where it pays fulsome lip service to Chávez and Bolivarianism, has not been weakened let alone broken up as would be necessary if the workers and peasants were to take power and build a genuinely socialist society.
Contradictions developing
Indeed, events like the defection of Baduel highlight the contradictions within the Chávez camp. These contradictions even have a class character at the mass base of the Bolivarian socialist movement. It demonstrates the possibility of a rupture between the Chavista leaders and the base, one which the working class movement must encourage, rather than either treating “Bolivarian socialism” as a united and static entity on which no demands can be placed. Another danger would be to regard its evolution to revolutionary socialism a an inevitable product of the objective process.
Whilst defending the right of the working class to organise independently as organisations such as the UNT have led the way in doing, the working class must ensure the social defeat of bourgeois and imperialist backer sponsors of the “No” campaign on the streets and in the workplaces. But this must be done by depriving the reactionaries of all their remaining bastions of power, their control of the media, of the economy and their control of the army.
Through the mobilisation to defeat those reactionary sectors the Venezuelan working class can consolidate its gains so far and demand delivery on those it has been promised. To do this it will require the creation of councils of delegates, amongst the workers, peasants, urban poor and the rank and file soldiers. It will need a democratically controlled militia. Above all it will need a revolutionary party, which at present can be fought for within Chávez’s PSUV and in the trade unions. But with the forces of reaction emboldened by Chávez’ self-inflicted defeat, time is not unlimited to fulfil these urgent tasks.