Markus Lehner, Infomail 1233, 6 October 2023
The parliamentary elections on 15 October in Poland are generally described as an election of fate. Not that fundamental questions of property relations are at stake, as in 1989, but a third electoral success of the right-wing nationalist PiS (Law and Justice Party) would exacerbate the already existing authoritarian tendencies, if not make them irreversible for a longer period of time.
PiS record
In recent years, PiS governments have managed to undermine essential features of liberal democracy. Most notable are the judicial reform (direct political influence on the appointment of judges) and control over the public media. Both are crucial to push through the national conservative “turn”, which is expressed, for example, in a de facto abolition of the right to abortion, of rights of LGBTIAQ people, of national minorities and refugees, etc. It also includes a further strengthening of social democracy. It also includes a further strengthening of the social role of the particularly conservative Catholic Church in Poland. Significant is the recent episode surrounding a private broadcaster’s revelation of abuse cases in the Catholic Church covered up by former Pope John Paul II as Archbishop of Krakow. These revelations led to reactionary mass demonstrations against this “attack on the memory of the saint” and subsequently to a legislative initiative by the PiS government to criminalise such attacks on the saint (just as earlier publications about Polish involvement in Jewish persecutions during World War II were legally linked to severe penalties).
This clearly reactionary characteristic of the PiS, however, has a reverse side in terms of social policy: The opposition PO (Civic Platform) under the then Prime Minister (2007 – 2014) Donald Tusk was characterised by particularly neoliberal attacks on the social conditions of workers and farmers, e.g. raising the retirement age, worsening trade union rights, abolishing social benefits, radical privatisations. This led not only to a further deterioration of the social situation of many pensioners and the deterioration of access to the health system, but also to growing social protests against the PO government.
The situation of the Polish working class since the fall of communism in 1989 has been marked by the problem of the division of the trade union movement (today there are three medium-sized trade union confederations with a low degree of organisation of 12%). The great illusions in “Solidarnosc” as a trade union and political force (with over 10 million members at its foundation and around 2 million in 1989) quickly shattered in the period of shock therapy. While it sank into insignificance as a political grouping in the early 2000s, as NSZZ Solidarnosc (Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity) it is today more of a typical “Christian trade union” and with 600,000 members has sunk to the level of the former state trade union OPZZ (Confederation of National Trade Unions), which is close to the left and mostly more radical in industrial disputes. The third federation, FZZ (Trade Union Forum), sees itself as a “neutral” trade union between the two blocs. Against the Tusk government, however, all trade unions were united for the first time and also mobilised successfully, which contributed to the fall of the neoliberal PO government in 2015. Since then, however, their unity has come to an end after Solidarnosc aggressively supported the PiS. This is also linked to the fact that the PiS has taken up some of the union’s demands, especially regarding the rolling back of the pension reform, but also the extension of certain social benefits, e.g. The 500+ child benefit, which is promised to be extended to 900+ in the current election campaign (one zloty is currently equivalent to 0.22 euros).
Poland’s economy to the point of pandemic
This policy of “social welfare” for “real pol:icians” was made possible by the temporarily favourable economic development since about 2005. Even during the “Great Recession” there were positive growth figures in Poland, unlike in most other European countries. This development was based on increased exploitation rates of the Polish working class (longer working hours, low wage levels, few company rights, etc.), a nevertheless weighty domestic market, favourable energy costs (coal and oil also from Russia!) and a connection to the supply chains of German industry in particular. Strong economic growth for more than a decade seemed to put Poland on a par with the large Western European economies.
The PiS government’s social concessions since 2015 and the continued favourable economic development strengthened both a new national self-confidence among the petty bourgeoisie and illusions of many workers in the PiS as the “lesser evil” given the experience with the PO and the social democratic SLD (League of the Democratic Left). The PO essentially continued the “reforms” of the SLD governments of the 2000s. This also explains the success of the PiS in the last elections in 2019, when it gained 6 per cent and won with 43.6 %, clearly ahead of the PO’s electoral alliance (27.4 %). The left-wing alliance Lewica (Left) was able to improve slightly with 12.6 % (+1.4 %) and stabilise overall. In addition to the SLD, the “Razem” (“Together”), founded in 2015, also competed in this alliance for the first time. Overall, PiS achieved a parliamentary majority within the framework of the “United Rights” parliamentary group and was not dependent on coalition partners, e.g. the far-right “Konfederacja” (Confederation of Freedom and Independence; 6.8 %), or an alliance with the peasant party PSL (8.6 %).
Change in the economic situation
In the meantime, the economic situation as well as the foreign policy situation has changed completely. Poland was hit hard by the Corona crisis at the latest, as well as by the subsequent supply chain crisis and global inflationary trends. It has the highest inflation rate in Europe (currently at 12 %) and is far from regaining its pre-Corona level (the last quarter even shows a slump of – 8.5 %). Overall, the economy is suffering both from rising energy costs since the start of the Ukraine war and from general transformation problems. These include, for example, the requirements to phase out coal production as well as the restructuring of the car industry (some German car companies have cut staff in Polish plants this year).
No wonder the PiS government is on a confrontational course not only on judicial reform but also on the EU transformation programme with Brussels, the Green Deal. Meanwhile, the penalty payments to the EU have accumulated to more than half a billion euros. More serious, however, is the withholding of 35 billion from the EU’s Corona Reconstruction Fund. Poland is not in the euro and therefore has to cushion its currency with particularly high interest rates, also to prevent inflation from rising further. This, together with the withholding of cheap EU loans from the fund, is leading to a sharp deterioration in financing conditions, which is particularly noticeable in the construction sector and in private sector debt. “Innovative” government gifts such as “credit holidays” (suspension of instalment payments) do not in turn contribute to the creditworthiness of the Polish financial system. The government is under so much economic pressure that it has been trying for some time to reach a compromise with the EU on judicial reform in order to get the Corona Fund released. However, it is failing to do so because of its allies in the right-wing parliamentary group, especially the Minister of Justice. The result is further nationalist propaganda regarding “German colonialism” that would be operated from Brussels. In particular, the leader of the opposition PO, Donald Tusk, who returned to Poland after his time as EU Council President (2014 – 2019), is now systematically denigrated as a “German puppet”, also and especially in the state media.
Confrontation PiS-PO
The highlight of the campaign was certainly the passing of the so-called “anti-agent law”, generally referred to as the “Lex Tusk”. This law was ostensibly intended to exclude people who had been agents for Russia from state offices and especially from running for such offices. However, in the first drafts of the law, “agent activity” was defined so broadly that “soft policy” towards Russia could also be described as such and, coincidentally, examples of agreements with Russia from Tusk’s time in office or his time in the EU Council were cited. It was more than obvious that they wanted to take him out of the race – as a possible main opponent in the current parliamentary elections. For him and the PO, on the other hand, this was a successful template to rally behind them the growing number of people repulsed by the PiS’s authoritarian-reactionary turns and to organise several mass rallies. In June alone, about half a million people were at the protest rally; the last one has now taken place on 1 October. After intervention from Brussels and also from the US government, the law had to be substantially defused.
The PiS countered these opposition mobilisations with the already mentioned demonstrations in defence of John Paul II and the stirring up of hatred against migrants. In addition, they came up with the “ingenious” idea of linking the election on 15 October with a referendum in which people can answer whether they are in favour of accepting thousands of “illegals” into Poland as demanded by the EU. This bogus question can be used to waste cheap election campaign airtime in the state media at taxpayers’ expense. It is only embarrassing that recently a corruption scandal concerning the sale of EU migration documents was exposed, in which leading PiS functionaries were significantly involved. In fact, this is only one of many scandals in which the PiS party is now involved – so that many in Poland are now fed up with this party from this side as well.
Nevertheless, both its nationalist and social demagogy continues to catch on – and there continues to be justified rejection of Donald Tusk’s PO economic and social programme. Therefore, according to the latest polls, the election is still a toss-up. The PiS is likely to lose a few percentage points. Polls predict 38%, which would put it not far from a strengthened PO, whose electoral alliance can expect around 32%.
Other parties
Lewica is likely to lose some ground in the face of polarisation, but will still be safe in parliament at around 10 %. The 10% predicted for Konfederacja, which has become increasingly far-right, is also a cause for concern. Konfederacja is the only promising party to campaign for withdrawal from the EU (making it a difficult coalition partner even for PiS). The performance of the centre bloc of PSL and Polska 2050 (a party of the “third camp”, mostly made up of former PO members) is likely to be decisive in the election. Should it overcome the 8 % hurdle that exists in Poland for electoral alliances, the PiS would probably have lost. However, if the alliance does not make it, the PiS could probably continue as before.
Therefore, it is not surprising that in the last few weeks the fight has been mainly about the PSL’s base, the peasantry. Their importance can be seen in the fact that 12% of the Polish workforce is still employed in the agricultural sector. In particular, the protests against cheap grain from Ukraine apparently caused the PiS to panic, as it feared for its rich support in the countryside and especially in the east of Poland. The Polish government promptly began to torpedo the EU grain agreement with Ukraine and immediately to question (not only Polish) arms supplies in general, even if only as a bargaining chip. None of this has any real substance, but it shows how easy it is to play politics in Poland with historical anti-Ukrainian resentments – and how fragile even Poland’s “unwavering” support for hard-pressed Ukraine is.
Threat of attacks on the working class
The Polish workers, as well as the millions of exploited Ukrainians who have been used as cheap labour in Poland not only since the war, have nothing to expect from a PiS or PO-led government other than massive attacks, given the economic and political situation. Certainly, a continuation of the PiS government would mean a further intensification of authoritarian-reactionary repression, which must be countered by massive social mobilisation either way. However, in view of the debt and the economic slump, both political camps would also be prepared to further deteriorate working conditions and social benefits. The PiS government has already shown how far it can go in this respect with the recent teachers’ strike.
In this respect, the reformist electoral alliance Lewica appears to be the only alternative and Razem in particular the only visible left force in the larger mobilisations. Already in February, five major groups had come together to stand together again as “Nowa Lewica” (New Left): the SLD, Wiosna (“Spring”), the PPS (Polish Socialist Party), Unia Pracy (Labour Union) and Razem. Razem is known internationally for its stronger youth base and links in Germany with, for example, the IL or the Left Party. Internationally, it was active for a long time within the framework of the “Progressive International” of Varoufakis and Sanders. However, it left the latter after the start of the Ukraine war because of the lack of solidarity with Ukraine, which had been invaded by Russian imperialism. Razem had played an important role (even more so than the other organisations mentioned) in the social mobilisations against the reactionary PiS policies, especially in the more radical protests of the women’s movement (especially on abortion rights), the struggles for LGBTIAQ rights, but also in protests around the growing sectors of precarious employment (which could also be seen recently in Germany with those of the truck drivers in their struggle against wage theft).
Lewica
Lewica’s election programme certainly focuses on the right issues: Legal reduction of working hours to a 35-hour week, sliding inflation adjustment of pensions and benefits, adjustment of salaries of public employees, abolition of regulations enabling precarious employment and reactionary restrictions on abortion, reversal of judicial reform, abolition of the special rights of the Catholic Church, and much more. Razem is running some of the top candidates like Adrian Zandberg and Magdalena Biejat, but otherwise continues to be active mainly as a “movement party” in the various protests. Election campaigning is done only as “Lewica”.
As correct as many of these demands are, the various currents are unclear as to how they can be implemented, given the power relations not only in parliament and the political structures. Not only Polish capitalism is becoming increasingly aggressive, but also various right-wing organisations maintain ever more militant militias, which not only increasingly use violence against minorities and migrants. Even strikes are being fought with armed strike-breaking organisations (as could be seen recently on German motorway service stations against lorry drivers). Given the weakness of the Polish trade union movement (only the OPZZ openly supports the Lewica demands), a determined and broad mobilisation of workers, youth and the rural poor is needed to consistently fight through each of these demands and to protect the movement against the opposition of the right and capital.
Correctly, the defence of democratic rights and especially abortion rights and LGBTIAQ rights are put in the foreground and on the other hand the economic policy of the PO is denounced. At the same time, it openly hints at the possibility of a coalition with these neoliberals and leaves completely open what should then be done with the demands.
With regard to the Ukrainian war, there is a clear statement against Russia’s imperialist aggression. In view of the millions of Ukrainian workers in their own country, the ignorance of a part of the West European left towards the victims of Russian imperialism cannot be afforded either. However, Razem (and Lewica as a whole) do not only support the right of self-defence of Ukrainians.
Razem rightly criticises NATO as an imperialist military alliance. But the idea that NATO is “a necessary evil” in this conflict is naïve at best. Even if it is not directly intervening at the moment, its intervention in the war is not a negligible secondary factor, but rather a determining factor in the war. The intervention of the Western imperialist powers and their military alliance as well as the economic war against Russia are motivated by their geostrategic and economic interests, not by concerns for “democracy” and “self-determination”. This is shown not least by the fact that they are working to consolidate Ukraine’s semi-colonial dependence, this time through EU and US imperialism. Instead, there should be a joint struggle with the Ukrainian workers in Poland, too, to give Ukraine the means to defend itself without Western dictates and conditions, and to support Ukrainian wage-earners in building their own workers’ party independent of the reactionary Zelenskyi regime and Ukrainian nationalism.
Critical support for Levica
So, even if we don’t see a party in Poland running for election with sufficient anchorage for a revolutionary programme of the working class, it is certainly the case that Lewica (and especially Razem in it) do indeed unite those sections of the working class and youth behind them who want to actively and sometimes militantly oppose the coming attacks on democratic and social rights. Of course, in view of the experiences with the SLD in particular, we must warn against illusions in this reformist electoral alliance. In particular, it is a question of fighting any coalition with the two main bourgeois parties in the strongest possible terms (even the Razem leadership talks more or less clearly about possible coalitions). On the other hand, abstention from elections and another victory of the right will in no way improve the dynamics of the defensive struggles. Even if Lewica only wins 10% in the elections, the most militant sections of the workers’ movement, the left youth and the most politically progressive sections of women’s and LGBTIAQ activists will vote for this party in the ballot. It is also clear that among these layers are those workers and youth who are most likely to be won over to building a revolutionary alternative to reformism.
Critical electoral support for Lewica should be used to win forces for further mobilisations and, above all, to campaign in the supporting trade unions for the preparation of workplace and trade union defensive struggles and to strengthen them. With a corresponding deepening and radicalisation of such struggles, this can be advanced to the question of the formation of a workers’ and peasants’ government based on organs of struggle. Such a perspective must at the same time be linked to advancing the break with the traitorous bureaucracies within Lewica and the OPZZ – and at the same time leading the struggle for the formation of a new revolutionary workers’ party in Poland.