Dilara Lorin
The statement made by imprisoned Abdullah Öcalan on 27 February, in which he called on the PKK to enter into a peace process and lay down its arms, has caused unease and uncertainty among many Kurds. And not without reason; the current political situation in Turkey and Syria gives little cause for hope that national oppression will end.
Democratic development?
Not for Öcalan. While the authoritarian, Bonapartist character of the Turkish regime has become even more apparent since the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu, the presidential candidate of the Republican People’s Party, CHP, the detention of hundreds of demonstrators, and Kurdish MPs and activists continue to fill the prisons en masse, for the PKK leader the sun of democracy is rising. This is what he said in his statement:
„There is no alternative to democracy in the pursuit and realisation of a political system. Democratic consensus is the fundamental path. In line with this reality, a language of peace and democratic society must be developed.
The call by Mr Devlet Bahçeli (leader of the far-right MHP), together with the will expressed by the President and the positive reactions of the other political parties, has created an environment in which I am calling for the laying down of arms, and I take historical responsibility for this call.“
This has little or nothing to do with the reality in Turkey, but the PKK is following its leader anyway. At its 12th Congress from 5 to 7 May, it announced the laying down of arms and its own dissolution, and declared its intention to now pursue a new path; the struggle for Kurdish equality within the existing states and for socialism should henceforth be conducted exclusively by peaceful, democratic means.
The complete dissolution, however, is only to take place once certain conditions have been met, above all that Öcalan can lead and direct the process for the Kurdish side:
‘The decision of our congress to dissolve the PKK and end the method of armed struggle creates a strong foundation for lasting peace and a democratic solution. The implementation of these decisions requires that Rêber Apo be able to lead and guide the process, that the right to democratic politics be recognised, and that comprehensive, legally binding guarantees be ensured.’
Even if the fulfilment of this condition is uncertain, the decision represents a huge change, which further increases the uncertainty of many – even if it brought tears of joy to the families and mothers whose children lived as freedom fighters in the mountains and are now within reach again.
The ideological reorientation of the PKK – the path to today
First, it must be said that this is not the PKK’s first attempt to achieve a peace process within Turkey. In addition to numerous ceasefires, which were often broken by the Turkish army but also by measures taken by the Turkish government, the PKK has already announced its dissolution and a reorganisation of the organisation.
The biggest turning point in its history came with the imprisonment of its then leader Abdullah Öcalan and the political reorientation of the PKK. Since its foundation, the PKK had defined itself as a ‘socialist workers‘ party’ pursuing its goals by revolutionary means. On closer inspection, it was a Stalinist, petty-bourgeois nationalist party. Unlike large sections of the Kemalist-influenced Turkish left, the PKK recognised the enormous significance of the national oppression of the Kurdish people and the struggle for their right to self-determination, including the creation of a Kurdish state. At the same time, however, it remains deeply rooted in the Stalinist model of stages. In Kurdistan, it argued, there would be no socialist revolution, but a democratic, national one. The PKK must take a leading role, but the conditions were not yet ripe for a radical change in property relations; Kurdistan still had to go through a whole phase of capitalist development. Only then would the country be ‘ripe’ for socialism.
Politically, this meant that the PKK always sought an alliance with the ‘national’ petty bourgeoisie and the nationalist-patriotic Kurdish bourgeoisie, even though in reality the latter, and especially the large landowners, always preferred an alliance with the Turkish state against the PKK. In addition, the PKK did not see the mass struggle of workers and peasants as a central means of struggle, but rather guerrilla strategy, a form of struggle that corresponded to its petty-bourgeois nationalist orientation.
With the collapse of ‘real existing socialism’, it was not only the PKK that found itself on the defensive. It also became increasingly clear that, while the guerrilla movement could tie down the Turkish state, it could not defeat it. Even before Öcalan’s arrest, the PKK was in a strategic crisis and searching for a new direction. Ironically, it was the heaviest blow against the organisation’s leadership that accelerated its strategic reorientation.
In prison on Imrali, inspired by the writings of libertarian theorist Murray Bookchin, Öcalan and, with him, the PKK, abandoned the goal of an independent Kurdistan in favour of the ideology of democratic confederalism. This ideology sees its goal as an ‘intermediate phase’ between capitalism and a classless society and embeds the Kurdish question within existing nation states in a concept of autonomous rights.
This programmatic shift made it clear that the revolutionary mobilisation of the oppressed against the state was rejected as ‘utopian.’ Instead, it was replaced by the truly utopian idea of making the state superfluous in the long term through democratic reforms – as if the existing ‘democracy’ in Turkey, which is a farce anyway, had a cross-class character. This led to a stronger focus on gradual improvements that do not necessarily come into direct conflict with the existing state order.
This is also reflected in the programme: democratic confederalism does not actively attack existing oppressive states, it does not recognise the right of oppressed nations to secede from the state, and Öcalan openly rejects it. It certainly does not actively attack class relations, but focuses on social participation, freedom and the rights of minorities – aspects that are undoubtedly worth fighting for and defending.
In addition, women’s liberation has increasingly become the focus of the movement. At the same time, however, it remains critical to note that patriarchy, with its material basis, is not being comprehensively challenged and that, instead, a retreat to the village and a return to traditions are coming to the fore. It is hardly surprising that this is difficult to implement in practice without addressing class relations, exploitation and sexism, which reproduce themselves. This development can be observed, on the one hand, in the attempt to implement democratic confederalism in Rojava. On the other hand, the party’s current decisions are ultimately only a continuation of its existing programme.
In this respect, the dissolution of the PKK, even if it came as a surprise to many and was justified by a complete reversal of Turkish reality, is not so sudden. For years, the parliamentary struggle in Turkey, the attempt to establish a legal party combining Kurdish nationalism, left-wing populism and reformism, has been at the heart of politics. The guerrilla movement was really only a reserve force, a bargaining chip in the search for a ‘peace process’ that never came or was thwarted by the Turkish state. In Rojava, the PKK undoubtedly played a very important and progressive role in the fight against the Islamic State, but here too, its role was ultimately limited to that of an armed reserve.
All this allows us to understand the reasons that drove Öcalan and the PKK to self-dissolution. However, there were also other reasons related to the current situation in Turkey and Syria.
Imperialist power relations and Ankara’s political calculations
In October last year, Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the ultra-nationalist MHP, caused a stir with a surprising statement in parliament: if Abdullah Öcalan dissolved the PKK, he could imagine bringing him into parliament. This statement caused a stir and represented a symbolic and political taboo breach. Many within the MHP spoke out against it and even left the party. Only a few months later, on 27 February, Abdullah Öcalan published his much-noticed statement calling on the PKK to lay down its arms. This was followed in May by the PKK congress, at which the organisation decided to follow the call of its imprisoned leader.
These developments did not take place in a vacuum. The international situation was becoming increasingly tense. In particular, the fall of Syrian ruler Assad, with whom the PYD, as the Syrian offshoot of the PKK, had established neutral relations, brought new uncertainties. At the same time, the global confrontation between the geopolitical blocs led by the US and China is intensifying. The PKK is also coming under increasing pressure that threatens to crush it between these forces.
Turkey positions itself in this power structure as a regional power with its own ambitions, but whose influence hardly extends beyond its own neighbouring countries. Economic dependence on imperialist financiers remains, inflation is high and the cost of living is rising steadily in the country.
Turkey is pursuing its own interests in Syria. It was directly involved in attempts to destabilise Assad and is now seeking to make the so-called transitional government under al-Scharaa increasingly dependent on it. Turkey is flooding Syria with cheap goods, food, etc., and using the region as a new market.
Erdoğan can now also push through a more aggressive and larger wave of deportations of millions of refugees without attracting international attention. The fact that the issue of refugees in Turkey is and has been one of the main topics – and the main topic in the last elections – only highlights the extent to which this now plays into the hands of the current government.
There are also ideological and political similarities: the ruling Justice and Welfare party, AKP, and the Islamist-nationalist Syrian HTS are united by an ideological affinity, both instrumentalising Islam to legitimise their political strategies, both domestically and in the occupied territories of Syria.
Above all, it is clear that, given the current international power structure, Erdoğan is trying to close ranks at home. The current government cannot afford to risk major internal conflicts at a time of global realignment and potential armed conflict. It seems much more important that Kurdish and Turkish workers can be mobilised together in the event of armed conflict to defend the interests of the Turkish state. Turkey’s intervention in Syria, as part of NATO, mind you, also means a military front that is moving geographically closer and closer to Israel.
A dangerous fallacy: belief in the democratic path in Turkey
When the letter was first published in February, with the late Sırrı Süreyya Önder reading Öcalan’s letter as part of the İmralı delegation, there was little euphoria in the room where the statement was read out. Even though it was a ‘historic moment’ – after all, Öcalan had hardly made any public statements for years and reports of possible visits were virtually non-existent – it was clear that the statement filled many of them with uncertainty.
It rightly emphasised that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many left-wing movements had reoriented themselves and so-called real socialism was increasingly being criticised. However, it remained unclear to the population under what conditions and with what concrete demands the dissolution of the PKK was announced at that time.
Over the following months, it became apparent that talks were being held between the AKP-MHP government and members of the Peoples‘ Equality and Democracy Party, DEM, who were also part of the İmralı delegation, without these discussions being made transparent.
In his statement, Öcalan declared that the PKK had fulfilled its ‘historic mission’ of bringing the Kurdish question to the centre of political discourse and breaking through decades of denial and assimilation policies. The PKK’s congress declaration adds that the Kurdish question has now reached a point where it can be resolved by democratic means.
However, the political situation in Turkey has not changed in any way that would make a ‘democratic path’ seem realistic or viable. On the contrary: since 2015/2016, when the HDP entered the Turkish parliament with double-digit support on its own, numerous MPs have been elected, many of whom remain in prison to this day.
The hope that the dissolution of the PKK would also invalidate the accusations of terrorism against Kurdish activists, and indeed the entire population, is illusory. It shows how much false hope is being placed in the Turkish state, which has repeatedly proven itself to be unyielding and repressive in the past.
The PKK is supposed to lay down its arms for good in the summer, even though the Turkish army is still attacking areas where PKK fighters are located. What has happened to the fighters remains unclear to this day. The real problem has never been the existence of the PKK itself. People have been and continue to be imprisoned without any solid evidence. The Turkish state has proven this many times and will, if necessary, use other repressive measures to continue on its course. But why is Erdoğan taking this step?
Constitutional change as a power strategy: Erdoğan, the DEM party and pressure on the Kurdish movement
Erdoğan plans to amend the Turkish constitution, officially to enshrine certain rights for Kurds. In reality, however, his goal is to be able to run for president again, which would require a constitutional amendment. He is well aware of the political potential of the Kurdish population in Turkey: if he fails to win them over, their resistance could take to the streets and further undermine his dwindling popularity. A broad democratic mass movement, supported by Kurdish and Turkish workers, would pose a real threat to him.
Erdoğan lacks the necessary majority in parliament for the planned constitutional amendment. To initiate a referendum on the issue, he needs at least 360 votes. However, together with the MHP, the AKP only has around 330 MPs. The largest opposition party, the CHP, is out of the question as an ally, as it has announced that it has no confidence in such a constitutional amendment, especially since Erdoğan does not adhere to the existing constitution even today. Erdoğan is therefore specifically seeking the support of the Kurdish DEM party, whose 56 MPs could give him the necessary majority.
The current constitution dates back to the period after the military coup in the 1980s. There is no doubt that changes are needed, but the question remains as to whose interests these changes would serve and who would implement them. Isolated concessions to Kurds will not end structural oppression. As history shows, legal regulations are one thing – social reality is another.
Although Erdoğan emphasises in his speeches that he will listen to the will of the people and not stand for re-election, his actions speak a different language. The arrest of his biggest political rival, Ekrem İmamoğlu (CHP), in autumn 2024 and a planned judicial reform reinforce the authoritarian character of the Turkish regime. Nevertheless, Erdoğan’s popularity is growing among sections of the population who see him as the one who is striving for ‘peace’ with the Kurds.
Since the beginning of his term in office, the number of prisoners has risen dramatically, as has the number of prisons. There are currently more than 400 prisons in Turkey. Politically motivated arrests have long been the norm in order to weaken opposition movements. Human rights organisations estimate that the number of prisoners has tripled in the last six years.
A further step is the so-called 10th Justice Package, which the government is presenting as a sign of a new era. Among other things, it provides for the early release of sick and elderly prisoners, including those from the PKK. A broader amnesty for Kurdish prisoners, as demanded by the DEM party, will only be discussed in the autumn, if at all, when the constitutional reform is presented.
The DEM party members of the Justice Committee have sharply criticised these reform plans. They accuse the government of continuing systematic discrimination and further endangering social peace with its proposals. In a letter, they emphasise that the concessions for prisoners explicitly exclude political prisoners. This, they say, undermines the principle of equality before the law.
In conclusion, it can be said that in Erdoğan’s constitutional reform, human rights and Kurdish rights play a decorative, secondary role, primarily intended to help secure his position and re-election as president. If the DEM party were to agree to this process, it would amount to a betrayal of its own movement.
In addition, Erdoğan has systematically crushed the Kurdish movement: leading members of the DEM (formerly HDP) have been in prison for years. With the arrest of İmamoğlu, liberal and nationalist forces have also been removed from the scene. This is intended to further consolidate the Erdoğan regime. Democratic participation, as demanded by the PKK and which, according to Öcalan, would increase, is a mere farce under such conditions.
The movement is calling on the population, especially young people and women, to take the Kurdish question into their own hands democratically. However, this appeal is met with harsh reality: ongoing repression, high inflation, social insecurity and fear of further criminalisation, as well as the lack of a broad mass organisation, are paralysing large sections of the population.
This is not about clinging to guerrilla tactics, even if armed struggle has been a source of hope for many Kurds for decades, at least symbolically, in their struggle against the state. The Kurdish movement within the population is no longer as strongly organised as it was in the 1990s or during the years of resistance against IS in Kobanê (city and canton of the Kurdish self-governing region of Rojava; ed.).
Meanwhile, the DEM party is increasingly focusing on demands for local self-government, as was evident at its recent two-day meeting in Amed (Turkish: Diyarbakır; editor’s note). This is certainly a progressive demand. But in the current climate, it is at best a political sideshow. Focusing on it means ignoring the big issues facing Turkey – the consolidation of Erdoğan’s barely ‘democratic’ dictatorship, the deep economic crisis, national oppression, Turkey’s regional ambitions and the reactionary interventions associated with them.
What needs to be done today
Although the DEM MPs involved in various parts of the process repeatedly issue statements criticising the actions of the government and the committees in the peace process, some talks are still taking place behind closed doors. This must end; all negotiations must be made public and accessible to the population.
Then it would quickly become clear that the so-called peace process serves primarily to pacify the Kurds and to give the Turkish regime a respite in its fight against the democracy movements. The Kurdish question must always be included in these mass protests for İmamoğlu’s release. At the same time, the Kurdish parties and the masses must reject any special deal with Erdoğan and must not allow themselves to be drawn into the government’s divisive tactics.
There must be no concessions and no trust on the part of the PKK or the DEM party towards the current government! No to a constitutional amendment that further consolidates Erdoğan’s power! Instead: Immediate release of all political prisoners, lifting of all bans on assembly and parties, reinstatement of all dismissed Kurdish mayors and local administrations!
Erdoğan, Bahçeli and their parties will never voluntarily agree to these basic democratic demands. This alone requires a mass movement that goes far beyond the mobilisations of recent months and truly shakes the regime. The so-called peace process is a road to nowhere.
Instead, we need a movement that unites Kurdish and Turkish workers and all oppressed people. A common struggle can and must be waged in defence of democratic rights, including the Kurdish right to self-determination; it must be waged in the struggle against inflation, for a sliding scale of wages and incomes for pensioners and the unemployed, for a minimum wage that is enough to live on, against all impending layoffs and closures.
Today, more than ever, the right to Kurdish self-determination must be defended. However, this right to self-determination cannot be achieved, expanded and protected through a pseudo-reform of the Turkish state, but only in the broader context of a permanent revolution in the Middle East. The biggest obstacle, as in Rojava, is a leadership crisis, the absence of a revolutionary party that can win the masses to the generalisation of this liberation struggle.
Even if the PKK has decided to dissolve itself, it is unclear whether this will actually happen. After all, the Turkish army continues to fight the guerrillas. Undoubtedly, however, it needs to take a (self-)critical look at itself. But the solution proposed by Öcalan and the majority of the PKK, replacing the guerrilla strategy with a legal, petty-bourgeois democracy, is not a solution. What is needed instead is a strategic and programmatic reorientation, the struggle for a revolutionary workers‘ party in Turkey and a new, revolutionary International.