After its defeat in Lebanon, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) acted as all humiliated armies do: it took its revenge against a weak and unarmed civilian population; the Palestinian civilians in Gaza. These atrocities, in contrast to those in Lebanon, have gone largely unreported. The last five months have seen the deaths of 479 Palestinians (of whom 80% were civilians), with 4,200 injured. Israel’s casualties have consisted of two soldiers and one civilian.
The single bloodiest incident occurred on 8 November in Beit Hanoun, when a “misdirected” Israeli artillery barrage killed 20 people, 13 of them from one family, of whom 2 were women and 6 were children. Days before, the same town saw Israeli troops fire into a crowd of about 500 unarmed women protestors, who had surrounded a mosque to protect 60 Hamas militants – sons, brothers and husbands – trapped there when Israel invaded the town. Beit Hanoun lies at the north-east edge of the Gaza Strip, about 3 miles from the Israeli town of Sderot, and has been blamed by Israel for Palestinian rocket attacks on Sderot and nearby Ashkelon.
The Palestinians, for their part, point to their crude homemade Qassam rockets as one of their few means of deterrence against the hi-tech might of the IDF.
This has happened against the backdrop of an ongoing humanitarian crisis caused by the cutting of international aid packages, and Israel’s refusal to remit tax revenues to the Palestinian Authority (PA) since the election of a Hamas-led government in January. In this way the “Quartet” of big powers (the US, EU, Russia and the United Nations) have shown that their commitment to “democracy” breaks down the minute it delivers a result they do not like. A society forced to live on charity and UN rations for 50 years has seen even those rations taken away when it elected the “wrong” government.
What are Israel’s objectives in this war? Ehud Olmert’s government has continued the policy of “unilateral disengagement” from Gaza begun by his predecessor, Ariel Sharon. It cannot want to resume the burden of reoccupying and administering the Gaza Strip – even though it can, and does, make regular punitive incursions there. Rather, its objectives are threefold.
Firstly, to improve Israeli morale following the failure to defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon, by taming the Palestinians in advance of any resumption of negotiations.
Secondly, to politically disconnect Gaza’s status from that of the West Bank, so that Israel can reap the expected rewards from its withdrawal from Gaza – namely, the expansion of the West Bank Jewish settlements and the completion of the apartheid wall.
Thirdly, to weaken the Palestinians by dividing them amongst themselves, using Fatah as a counterweight to Hamas, at least until Hamas “sees sense” by recognising Israel and “renouncing terrorism”.
This is what lies behind Israel’s own assertion that the constantly demanded ceasefire does not apply to the West Bank, and its insistence that the formation of a “national unity” government including Fatah is a precondition for any new talks. The “best-case” scenario for Israel is that it can split the Palestinians into 3 or 4 competing fiefdoms (Gaza, Jenin-Nablus, Hebron and Ramallah-Bethlehem) each with its own political and security apparatus, negotiating separately for the basics of their existence.
The demand for the release of Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier captured by militants in June, is a smokescreen, and especially hypocritical given that Israel holds 9,500 Palestinian prisoners, including 350 women and 150 children. Israel would be waging this war with or without him.
Similarly, the demand for a “unity government” is really aimed at fostering Palestinian disunity. In this way, Israel hopes to undermine the results of an election in which Hamas won a large enough vote to form a majority government. Just in case it cannot get this done peacefully and “legally”, Israel is already making preparations for an effective coup against Hamas.
It has allowed weapons transfers to the praetorian guard of PA president Mahmoud Abbas, has approved the deployment to Gaza of the Badr Brigade (a part of the Fatah-controlled Palestine Liberation Army currently stationed in Jordan), in preparation for a confrontation with Hamas, and has allowed the Jordanian and Egyptian intelligence services to upgrade their longstanding and major, though understated, involvement in “keeping order” in the Palestinian territories.
A unity government with Fatah, if one can be stitched together, might give Hamas’ political wing the cover that it needs to excuse the compromises that it will be forced to make once Israel resumes negotiations.
The politicians could always settle for a mini-state in Gaza in exchange for being allowed to “Islamicise” Palestinian public life there. This, of course, will not be without opposition from elements in the armed wing who joined Hamas to fight the occupation, not to impose their religious beliefs on their co-nationals. But, without turning to a strategy based on mass methods of struggle, in which the working class and urban poor are organised on the basis of class interest and play the leading role, no other road is open.