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Trump’s openness put to the test by Putin‘ closure. The unknown variables in global relations.
Lenin frames imperialism as a dynamic phenomenon, permanently exposed by its very nature to ever-changing relations, particularly between the great powers. Today, the change of direction of the planet’s main power makes Lenin’s method of analysis all the more relevant. The mobility of world relations has accelerated sharply, with repeated changes of scenario and many unknown variables. Trump’s persona and his now proverbial ‚unpredictability‘ is a secondary manifestation of this phenomenon, albeit a very important one. However he is not the only protagonist. Russian imperialism and Chinese imperialism are no less active on the world stage, and no less influential on its dynamics and on the choices made by the American administration.
Trump’s openness to Russian Imperialism
In the months following its inauguration, the new US administration’s openness to Putin’s regime and its war of invasion of Ukraine is not a matter of analysis but a fact. Only the campists, with the ideological blindness of their mantra („war by proxy“) have proved incapable of grasping it.
We must take the following facts into consideration: the joint vote by the US, Russia and Israel at the UN against the condemnation of the invasion (on its third anniversary, on February 24th); the humiliation of Zelensky on all media as ‚responsible‘ for the war, with the request for his surrender (‚you don’t have the cards‘); the suspension of military satellite coverage of Ukrainian forces during the operation in Kursk to put pressure on Kyiv; the imposition on Ukraine, under blackmail, of a robbery-like deal based on the plundering of its mineral resources; a US „peace“ proposal based on the recognition of Russian military conquests of Ukrainian territories, complete with Kellogg’s map of the possible division of the country (territories annexed to Russia in the east, a central Ukraine with a „demilitarised“ Kyiv, and the west of the country with Lviv possibly protected by European imperialist powers); the rejection of new US sanctions against Russia, in addition to those already imposed by Biden; the public legitimisation of Vladimir Putin as a privileged partner of the US and of President Trump in particular („We have a good relationship“, „He is a man who defends his country“…); the announced reduction of new military aid to Ukraine once the aid provided by Biden is over; the general definition of the defence of Ukraine as ‚Biden’s war‘, to be definitively ended (‚with me there would have been no war‘); the blatant marginalisation of European powers from the Russian-American negotiations (and more generally from any negotiating arena, as in the case of the Middle East); the adoption of anti-EU propaganda modelled on Moscow’s tone and arguments (including support for the German far right in the midst of an election campaign, and for the Romanian far right), combined with the trade war against the EU (and others).
All these events are intertwined and rapidly unfolding. They have highlighted the deep ambivalence of US policy towards Russia. This shift appears to be aimed at establishing direct relations between major powers outside the traditional transatlantic alliance, in order to achieve a general renegotiation of the global balance of power. Russia’s indirect involvement in the Iranian and Middle Eastern crisis, as a stabilising force in Tehran, has been part of this new American negotiating approach.
We, as PCL and International Socialist League, have repeatedly analysed this shift, its premises, characteristics and difficulties. Many questions were raised and remain open: Has Trump tried to separate Russia from China in order to focus on his strategic competition with Beijing? Is he simply trying to get out of the Ukrainian conflict in order to allocate the resources to social spending cuts and tax cuts for US capitalists? Is he aiming at an agreement with Moscow on the management of the Arctic, its enormous wealth and its strategic role, as well as at a new business and investment intervention in Russia in exchange for its precious raw materials? Or is it a combination of all these factors in various degrees? These and other questions will be answered by the unfolding events, within a global scenario deeply shaken by Trump’s change of approach.
Putin’s plan took Trump by surprise
However, there is a problem. Vladimir Putin has barely responded to Donald Trump’s great openness.
Let’s be clear. From a formal, political and diplomatic point of view, Putin has understandably welcomed Trump’s openness, which is probably broader than he expected. He gained recognition as a major global player. His war of invasion was legitimized. And, de facto, he was freed of the status of war criminal sanctioned by the International Criminal Court. He publicly hailed the new US president as a ‚man of peace‘, emphasised his break with the previous administration, and in his propaganda he took advantage of the contradiction between US imperialism (‚aimed at peace‘) and European imperialism (‚warmongers‘). His own prestige as commander-in-chief of the war operations has been strengthened in the eyes of a large part of his social base in Russia itself. And with it, his military pressure, directly proportional to Ukraine’s weakening, grew stronger.
But all this was not and is not enough for Putin. The President of the Russian Federation is not satisfied with the new offer from US imperialism. He is aiming for the complete victory of the ’special military operation‘ and its underlying objectives. At least the war objectives, redefined as ’subordinate‘ after the initial failure to conquer Kyiv: the full conquest of the four annexed regions; the drastic downsizing of the Ukrainian military force (‚demilitarisation‘); the political elimination of Zelensky (the so-called ‚denazification‘). This will take place with the conquest of Ukraine, the revival of a Russian imperial area in Europe, in the footsteps of the old tsarist tradition. This is what Great Russian chauvinism openly welcomes and claims (Dugin), with the blessing of the Orthodox Church of Patriarch Kirill (former KGB agent) and his campaign against Western ‚Satanism‘.
Putin’s goal cannot be reached easily nor taken for granted. Russia’s military progress on the battlefield – now undeniable – is slow. In three years of war, despite the huge imbalance in forces, the area of Ukraine that has been militarily conquered and is considered under control does not exceed 20% of the country. Those who have been celebrating Ukraine’s defeat and Russia’s victory every day for three years (Italian journalist Marco Travaglio in particular, followed by other members of the Italian ‚campist‘ intelligentsia) have a problem with both reality and logic. Even Russia’s difficulties related to the war economy (inflation, high interest rates, labour shortages, risk of recession) seem to have increased overall, and with them the uncertainties about the future.
And yet Putin is determined to carry on gambling. On the war front, he is taking advantage of a relative weakening of Ukrainian defences; on the domestic front, he is mobilising nationalist sentiment – today mainly anti-German – around the memory of the ‚Great Patriotic War‘, openly incorporating Stalin into Great Russian chauvinism, promoting the restoration of statues and memorials. He is intensifying internal repression (it is much harsher today than in the first phase of the war); he diverts social discontent towards xenophobia, covering up a policy of pogroms against immigrants with the support of the fascist organisation Russian Community. He recruits soldiers from prisons and neighbouring regions of the federation – in order to spare as much as possible the White Russian population, which is the heart of his support base – paying them handsomely. He is resorting to massive support from North Korean troops and weapons (which were decisive in the recapture of Kursk). Above all, he is relying on the great material power of his Chinese ally (purchase of oil, supply of technology) and on a net of international relations (see United Arab Emirates) that allows him to dodge Western sanctions. These are the strengths of the regime, despite the setback in Syria with the fall of Assad and the weakening of its Iranian ally (Moscow has carefully refrained from helping Iran, in order not to compromise its relations with Israel).
In this general context, Putin saw the change of direction of the US administration and the new contradictions between the US and the EU not as an opportunity to end the war with a ‚peace‘ solution (fundamentally victorious for Russian imperialism – such as that offered by Trump), but as an opportunity to relaunch its military offensive to take the spoils of war. This is an unscrupulous attempt to exploit the internal divisions within the imperialist NATO camp to his own advantage. The two rounds of negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv – except for the exchange of prisoners – were used by Putin to gain time for war, behind the smokescreen of a diplomatic operation.
That’s why Trump was taken by surprise, he is ‚disappointed‘ by Putin, he suspects that he has been ‚played‘ by the Kremlin leader. Hence the tactical repositioning of the US president: he resumed contact with European imperialist powers, he reactivated some military support for Ukraine, and he gave an ultimatum to Putin – fifty days ‚to make peace‘, under threat of new and heavier sanctions.
The unknown variables of a new scenario
Are we witnessing a return of the US to its old alliances, in the name of a rediscovered Atlanticism? No, that is not the case today.
Trump’s repositioning, while important, remains a tactical manoeuvre. „I’m not done with Putin“, Trump says, and that is true. US arms supplies to Ukraine are currently resuming little by little, with slow procedures and timelines, and are being paid for by European powers (a huge pro for the US arms industry). „Fifty days“ is precisely the timetable for completing the full military conquest of the annexed regions, as communicated by Putin to Trump on July 4th: not exactly an „ultimatum“.
The evaluation method of the outcome of these fifty days is currently very vague (a ‚peace‘ agreement, the start of negotiations?). The outline for any threatened sanctions also remains unclear: trade volumes between the US and Russia are worth five billion dollars, which is objectively negligible. Indirect sanctions („100%“) against those countries that actually support Russia, such as China and India, would have enormous repercussions on the global economy. They would jeopardize the strategically valuable relations between the US and India, and are therefore considered not so credible. Therefore, US repositioning is currently aimed at putting pressure on Russia rather than at breaking relations. The Moscow Stock Exchange responded to the US ‚threats‘ with a rise in share prices, as if celebrating a narrow escape. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, Trump quickly reassured everyone: ‚I am neither with Russia nor with Ukraine, I am on the side of mankind‘ (!)
It is true, however, that Trump expects results from Putin. The prestige of US imperialism on a global scale and Trump’s image on the domestic front are at stake. How could it be otherwise? A Financial Times journalistasked Trump: „If after fifty days the situation is unchanged, what will your reaction be?“, Trump replied: „Please don’t ask me that question“. The truth is that the new US imperialist administration is sailing by sight, with a good dose of empiricism.
Global instability
Two fundamental facts remain:
1) US imperialism in decline is no longer able to sustain the burden of its old sphere of influence. If the US wants to focus on the strategic confrontation with China in the Pacific, they need to reduce their exposure on other theatres: in the Middle East, where Trump is working to relaunch and extend the Abraham Accords to Saudi Arabia and even to the new Syria, as a guarantee for the Zionist state (but not without contradictions with Netanyahu’s self-centred policy, which is in turn in conflict with Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman project); and also in Europe, where he is trying to get the US out of the war in Ukraine and reduce the current presence of US troops on the continent: a presence that today amounts to 67,000 troops, which Trump would like to halve in order to move 30,000 to the Indo-Pacific.
An agreement with Putin would be beneficial on both sides. But it cannot be free, as Putin would like.
2) The great rearmament of European imperialist powers is a response to the threat of US disengagement.
NATO remains in place and indeed formally remains the framework for European rearmament. But within itself, relations are undergoing a profound restructuring. Trump has even opened the door to a free interpretation of Article Five, a historic message to Putin that, however, demands a response. Meanwhile, France and Germany, in competition with each other, are signing bilateral military assistance agreements with Great Britain, which has returned to the European fold, and Denmark is doubling its military spending, partly to protect Greenland.
World relations are in turmoil in every corner of the planet, with multiple unknown variables. Everywhere, the force of arms underpins the negotiating power of imperialist powers, old and new. Everywhere, proletariat and oppressed peoples are bargaining chips or cannon fodder. Only a socialist revolution can rebuild the world on new foundations.