Tomasz Jarosław
The election victory of Karol T. Nawrocki, the candidate of the national conservative PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – Law and Justice) party, with 51.2% of the vote in the 2025 presidential election is a clear defeat for the ruling ‘Koalicja Obywatelska’ (KO – ‘Citizens‘ Coalition’) party and its candidate Rafał K. Trzaskowski with 48.8%. This victory confirms the authoritarian tendencies that PiS has been consistently pursuing for years – while at the same time presenting itself as a ‘social’ alternative. However, the KO, which narrowly failed to prevent PiS from winning the election, remains a non-viable alternative.
Background and significance
In 2023, the KO coalition led by the Platforma Obywatelska – Civic Platform party, PO, replaced the right-wing nationalist government that had been dominated by the PiS since 2014. After years of authoritarian restructuring and restrictions on fundamental rights, this appeared to many to be a new beginning, but to others it was merely a respite.
The KO appointed Donald F. Tusk as head of government, but the presidency remained in the hands of PiS representative Andrzej S. Duda. Since the president can veto bills, control of the presidency was a key factor in the government’s ability to act politically. Winning the presidency was therefore a crucial goal for KO in order to reverse the right-wing reforms of PiS. Election forecasts predicted an extremely close result, and the actual election was hotly contested.
For about two decades, politics in Poland has been characterised by the ‘polarity’ between the KO and PiS, after the previously dominant ‘Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej’ (Alliance of the Democratic Left) SLD, a post-communist, social democratic party of the transition and its allies (such as the Peasant Party) had dismantled themselves. Over the last decade, the SLD merged into the social democratic electoral alliance Lewica (‘The Left’) and was thus able to stabilise itself again, at least as a political factor. Only with the help of Lewica, the Peasants‘ Party and an allied conservative party (‘Third Way’) was KO ultimately able to win a parliamentary majority in 2023.
Why KO lost – and PiS was able to hold its ground
The first round of the presidential election revealed a weakening of the long-dominant polarity between PiS and KO, whose two candidates each won around 30% of the vote, giving them only some 60% combined. Right-wing extremist candidates received about 20% of the vote, with the rest going to the KO’s coalition partners. It was therefore clear that the race for the presidency would be extremely close.
The KO and its allies, including the conservative “Third Way” and the social democratic “Left”, were able to mobilise broad support in urban areas. However, the KO made a crucial mistake: in order to appeal to conservative, mainly rural, voters, especially in eastern Poland, it presented itself as the true representative of Christian values – coupled with a more restrictive, racist stance on migration.
This strategy proved ineffective: the expected influx of conservative votes failed to materialise. Instead, many urban, progressive and left-wing voters distanced themselves from the KO. The defeat was mainly due to the loss of these sections of the electorate.
Voter turnout in presidential elections in Poland is usually higher than in parliamentary elections, but in 2025 it was slightly lower than in 2023 (74%), at 71%.
Poland has undergone economic change over the past two decades: Neoliberal governments pursued aggressive privatisation and austerity programmes, while the PiS attempted to channel at least small portions of economic growth into social concessions in order to present itself as the “party of all Poles”. In doing so, it enriched itself considerably while consolidating its own position of power, which also included an authoritarian transformation of the state.
The staunchly nationalist course was accompanied by a further advance of Western capital. German corporations in particular control key industries such as shipbuilding, dairies, coal, steel, telecommunications, real estate and food retail. This contributed to price increases and unemployment until the early 2010s.
Since the KO’s election victory, the PiS has continued to portray itself as the defender of Poland against “foreign aggressors” and “occupiers”, maintaining its nationalist rhetoric, especially in rural and backward regions. In doing so, it has relied on promises of higher pensions and social benefits.
The role of the Catholic Church
Broad support from the Catholic Church, which continues to be an authority in rural regions, was decisive in the PiS’s electoral success. Church employees and those affiliated with church organisations were often indirectly pressured to vote for the PiS – those who resisted were threatened with consequences. The Church is an important political and economic player in Poland:
- It owns about 10% of the country;
- controls several media outlets (Radio Maryja, TV Trwam) and publishing houses (including Niedziela and Gość Niedzielny);
- runs numerous clinics, care facilities and nursing homes;
- maintains educational institutions ranging from private schools to universities.
- In total, over 100,000 people are directly or indirectly employed by church structures.
The close ties between PiS and the Church were reflected in the election campaign. PiS presented itself as a defender of Christian values, while in reality it represents the interests of the capitalist elites and promotes social inequality and hatred against minorities.
This contradiction has led to a certain process of detachment from the PiS among Christian-conservative voters, especially in urban areas. The Catholic electorate is no longer homogeneous. However, ultra-conservative Catholicism remains a powerful force, especially in rural areas.
The scandals surrounding PiS candidate Nawrocki
Nawrocki’s election victory seems all the more problematic in light of his personal scandals
- Homophobia and the cult of masculinity: Nawrocki has made homophobic statements on several occasions and propagates a rigid concept of masculinity – in a country where LGBT+ people are often discriminated against.
- Real estate fraud: He is involved in dubious real estate deals in which he acquired public land at bargain prices and evicted tenants, supported by connections to the underworld.
- Sexual exploitation: Between 2010 and 2012, Nawrocki worked as a security guard at a hotel in Gdańsk, where he is alleged to have been responsible for organising sex workers for hotel guests.
- Hooligans and right-wing extremism: Nawrocki was active in football hooligan groups, took part in violent riots and has proven links to right-wing extremist circles that regularly attack minorities.
- Drug scene: There are reports of his use of hard drugs, some of which were visible shortly before television appearances.
- Fan of Donald Trump: Nawrocki has repeatedly expressed his admiration for Trump: “Donald Trump is a man who is not afraid of political correctness. He says what he thinks, and that is exactly what Poland needs right now.”
These scandals and attitudes paint a picture of a controversial right-wing politician whose personal behaviour and connections make his reactionary agenda even more threatening. However, the politically central problem of the KO is Nawrocki’s veto power as president, which allows him to block virtually all legislative proposals. The PiS will make massive use of this because it hopes to replace the neoliberal KO in the elections in two years at the latest. The only issues on which there are likely to be no differences between the Tusk government and the new president are the continuation of massive rearmament and the continuation of the racist border regime in eastern Poland.
But that is not the end of the Tusk government’s problems. There are also internal differences within the coalition: while the left is committed to restoring individual rights and social programmes, the KO is pursuing neoliberal austerity programmes and, above all, economic integration into the EU. The “Third Way”, on the other hand, wants to continue some of the PiS’s conservative measures. The only thing they have in common is the goal of ousting the PiS from government – that is where their political unity ends.
Prospects for the left?
Both KO and PiS represent the interests of economic elites. KO’s neoliberal policies have exacerbated social problems and facilitated the shift to the right, because PiS was able to present itself as a ‘social’ alternative – for Poles, of course.
The only realistic alternative would be a truly socialist left that consistently fights against austerity measures, restrictions on democratic rights, social inequality, rearmament and NATO membership. Resistance to PiS and the shift to the right is currently being carried by diverse social movements in Poland, ranging from women’s and LGBT+ rights to environmental protection and social housing.
The wings of Lewica that emerged from the SLD clearly betray such goals in the name of the “politics of the lesser evil” by participating in the Tusk government with four ministers as a social fig leaf. The left wing of Lewica, the left-reformist umbrella movement Razem Lewica (“The Left – Together”, or Razem for short), has split over the question of the government – which also had a direct impact on the presidential election campaign. One of the previous “faces” of Razem, Magdalena Biejat, known as a women’s movement activist, was nominated as Lewica’s presidential candidate to support the knockout candidate in the second round.
In contrast, Razem itself, which has now distanced itself more clearly from Tusk’s neoliberal, racist policies, put forward its own candidate, the party’s co-chair, Adrian Zandberg. Zandberg was accused of “scandal” by the Polish right, which does not shy away from antisemitic or other racist monstrosities, for allowing himself to be photographed wearing Marx T-shirts.
Zandberg’s programme was the only one that clearly opposed racist migration policies and neoliberal austerity programmes, although it remained unclear on whether it would put a stop to Poland’s insane military spending (5% of GDP). Nevertheless, his candidacy represented a point of reference for the social and ecological protest movements in the political debate surrounding the presidential election. His winning nearly 5% of votes in the first round was an important sign of the search for a left-wing alternative, especially since he won over 19% of the youth vote, making him the second most popular candidate in this demographic. Overall, left-wing candidates won nearly 11% of the vote, their best result since 2011.
The breakdown of the increasingly unpopular KO/PiS polarity, which was particularly evident in the first round, certainly offers an opportunity for a strong left-wing alternative to emerge from the protest movements and among young people in the face of the general shift to the right in Poland. The break with Razem’s majority, which continued to support Tusk, should serve as a positive example for this reorientation. The five Sejm deputies who remained in the Razem majority also voted against Tusk in the vote of confidence.
To go further, the left must appeal not only to urban centres but also to rural eastern Poland – without adapting ideologically, but by addressing the material interests of these population groups, which are particularly affected by capitalist exploitation. In this way, backward and marginalised circles can be won over, reactionary ideologies weakened and a united front built in Poland and throughout Europe against elitism, social cuts and right-wing populism. Above all, however, it will be crucial for revolutionaries to intervene in Razem to advance the development of the left and fight for a revolutionary programme in the party.
Therefore: Trotsky instead of Nawrocki!