Martin Suchanek
The elections to the European Parliament will take place on 8/9 June. With more than 350 million eligible voters, it is second the largest this year after the elections in India.
However, the euphoria and enthusiasm of the electorate is limited. Although the European Parliament has gained more powers in recent years, both the population and the competing parties consider it to be of secondary importance compared to national parliaments. It is therefore no wonder that the public battle for votes and seats only begins a month before the decision. Up to now, the battle for positions on ists and competition for future for posts has caused more of a stir.
Character of the European Parliament
This also reflects the character of the European Parliament. Unlike the individual EU member states, the European Commission, the counterpart to the government at national level, is not directly elected by the Parliament. Instead, the presidency and commissioners (quasi ministers) are appointed by the Council of the European Union (also known as the EU Council of Ministers) by qualified majority and then proposed to Parliament. As the EPP list leader Manfred Weber (CSU) had to painfully learn in 2019, Parliament can of course reject the proposal and thus force the EU Council of Ministers to renegotiate but it cannot put its own proposal to the vote.
Nor can it launch its own legislative initiatives, but only amend, reject or adopt those of the European Commission.
In short, it is also formally a parliament with limited legislative powers. It plays second fiddle to the European Commission. In this respect, it is not fundamentally different from national parliaments, where the government and state apparatus concentrate political power, it is just more obvious here.
What is much more important, however, is that the European Commission does not want to be misunderstood as an EU government. Even if the European institutions have gained more competences in recent decades and also have considerable budgets, political power still does not ultimately lie with the supranational institutions, just as the EU is not a state but a confederation of states. The real power lies with the political executives of the nation states, more precisely with the traditional large imperialist states of Europe – Germany, France and Italy.
Even if they are by no means able to impose their will „omnipotently” and can occasionally be blocked by the „small“ ones, nothing works without them and, above all, these states represent the goal of shaping the EU into an imperialist bloc under their dominance, one which is to become capable of world power. The difficulties on this path ultimately reflect the fact that the dominant nations and the dominant national capitals are not just „partners“, but also competitors, who are all in favour of „unity“ and a „free market“, but only as long as it is not at their expense.
Inherent contradiction
No wonder, then, that European politics always comes up against this limit, a real inherent contradiction that cannot be resolved within capitalism, which makes it clear that the nation state and imperialist special interests are themselves an obstacle to the development of the productive forces, to the solution of all major European problems.
This tendency is exacerbated by the fact that the EU powers, and thus the EU itself, are forced to focus on their „core business“ in the increasingly fierce global battle for the redivision of the world: Armaments and war capability, building up its own major European capitals and high-tech industries, racist compartmentalisation through selective migration policies. And things are not looking rosy here either. The Green Deal, once sold as an „ecological“ and „transformational“ miracle by the EU Commission, has long since been consigned to the political rubbish dump of the “ever closer union” of its states.
The EU’s „grand coalition“
As the EU still embodies a strategic project of all its central member states, all the main political parties – the conservatives of the EPP, the Liberals, the greens and the social democrats – effectively act as a „grand coalition“ of the EU.
Of the 705 members, the EPP (European People’s Party), to which the German Christian Democrats and Christian Socials (CDU ?) CSU belong, currently has 178 MEPs, making it the largest group in Parliament. The S&D (Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats) has 140 MEPs, the Liberal Renew Europe, to which the German Free Democrats (FDP) belongs, 102 and the Green Group 72. Together they account for 492 seats, i.e. almost 70 %.
Even though all of these alliances are running for the European elections with their own leading candidates, it can be assumed that Ursula von der Leyen, the EPP’s lead candidate, will be re-elected.
Even though the European Parliament still only has limited rights, the elections are of course a barometer of the political mood in the EU and the balance of power.
Forecasts
The current polls assume that the EPP will be able to maintain or even slightly strengthen its position. The Social Democrats are also forecast to be able to maintain their share. However, significant losses are predicted for the Liberals (around a third) and the Greens (around half). Although this means that the „grand coalition“ of the European Parliament will continue to have a clear majority, there will be a shift towards the conservative camp.
The right-wing groups in the EU Parliament are very likely to be strengthened, although they will also have to deal with major internal differences – particularly with regard to the war in Ukraine. The largest increase is predicted for the „Conservatives and Reformists“ group. Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) is probably the most important party in this group, which can certainly be integrated into the EU majority, just as Meloni worked closely with von der Leyen and the EU Commission as a right-wing prime minister. The reason for this is that many of these parties are completely in line with the EU on the issue of war and rearmament.
The other, even more right-wing group, „Identity and Democracy“, which also includes Alternative for Germany (AfD) the Austrian Freedom Party , (FPÖ) and Marine Le Pen’s „Rassemblement National“ (RN), is only likely to achieve slight increases in votes – also because it already performed very strongly in the 2019 elections and the Italian Lega is likely to suffer significant losses.
Nevertheless, we can expect 20-25% for the European right-wing populist, right-wing conservative to far-right parties, a share of which is growing and consolidating overall, especially as some right-wing parties, such as Fidesz from Hungary, do not belong to any party alliance.
The group „The Left in the European Parliament“ (GUE/NGL) will maintain its share and, according to some forecasts, may even be able to increase it. The strongest single party in the group is likely to be Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s ,La France insoumise, which ran with its own alliance in 2019 but is now back in the group, as are other left-wing parties from France.
What to do in the elections?
According to Engels in „Origin of the Family“, universal suffrage provides an indicator of the maturity of the proletariat. „As long as the oppressed class, in our case the proletariat, is not yet ripe for its self-liberation, it will, for the most part, recognise the existing social order as the only possible one and will be politically the tail of the capitalist class, its extreme left wing.“
If we look at the results of 2019 and the forecasts for the European elections in 2024, the „maturity“, degree of organisation, class consciousness and programme of the proletariat are in a bad way.
If we take all parties that are socially, historically, and organically, based on the working class, the social democratic, in reality bourgeois workers‘ parties will get off lightly, but will clearly remain below 20% across Europe. The SPD, for example, will hardly lose because it already suffered its disaster in 2019 and therefore only has to „defend“ 16 out of 99 seats.
In any case, the majority of European social democrats have been in favour of a policy that not only wants to (co-)manage European capitalism during the entire legislative period and will continue to do so for the next one, but also of an aggressive imperialist foreign policy: sanctions and a new Cold War against Russia, NATO expansion and rearmament, the incorporation of (western) Ukraine into NATO and the EU, more or less unconditional solidarity with Israel, sanctions against Iran and direct intervention on Israel’s side through formations in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.
Of course, social democracy is also in favour of Fortress Europe, racist isolationism and selective migration – and it will remain a pillar of the EU Commission. This appalling list of reactionary policies could go on and on.
Even if the social democratic parties continue to have their social support in the working class, especially in the relatively better-off sections of the labour aristocracy, and dominate the trade unions in Europe, as a rule we should refuse to vote for these parties in these elections, because we cannot pretend to present a detailed analysis of the political-economic situation and the condition of the labour movement in each of the 27 member countries.
Left of the European Left
However, in many countries left-reformist organisations are taking part, which are mostly, but not always, part of the GUE/NGL (the most important exception here is probably the Greek KKE, whose Stalinist programme we fundamentally reject, but which, in contrast to the DKP or MLPD, has real roots in significant sections of the working class).
We call for the election of the parties of the European Left in most European countries, unless they do not represent a significant layer in the working class, but are only left-wing, reformist micro-parties.
In France, we support the election of the NPA. Even if it is not yet a party in the true sense of the word, it currently represents a potential starting point for the formation of a revolutionary party in France. Our support is certainly critical. We criticise the fact that it does not itself have an elaborated revolutionary programme, and we suggest that its comrades urgently discuss and develop one.
However, the situation in France is an exception from a European perspective. In contrast, in Germany we do not call for the election of ostensibly „Marxist“ or „revolutionary“ parties such as the DKP, the MLPD and the SGP (Socialist Equality Party). While the NPA has the potential to go in a revolutionary direction, the DKP and MLPD are ossified Stalinist wannabe parties, with the DKP also taking an opportunist stance towards Russian and Chinese imperialism. The SGP is a pseudo-radical sect which, in addition to general socialist „truths“, also represents fatal and reactionary positions, such as the rejection of organised revolutionary work in the trade unions and any united front with them.
DKP, MLPD and even more so PSG not only represent false positions that are contrary to a revolutionary programme, they do not even represent a significant minority of the working class or militant activists, unlike DIE LINKE.
DIE LINKE as an alternative?
However, DIE LINKE has also seen a further decline and loss of members in recent years. It has been further weakened by the split of the Sahra Wagenknecht movement (BSW), which launched its own populist people’s party. However, its mixture of pacifist anti-war positions, social demands and a cross-class programme that advocates a „sensible“ capitalist social market economy and joins the racist chorus of „rigid migration policy“ does not represent an electable alternative, but a break to the right, as we have already explained in detail in the special issue of NI (279) on the crisis of the Left Party.
DIE LINKE is currently a victim of the contradictions of its own reformist policies. On the one hand, it wants to pursue „class politics“, on the other hand, it wants nothing to do with the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism. So it boils down to more or less „left“ participation in shaping the system, government participation and „transformation strategy“ – not only in elections, but also in trade unions and social movements, where people turn left but never question the bureaucratic apparatuses or „allies“, but rather adapt to them.
Revolutionaries can never endorse the programme and strategy of such a party. Where they call for the election of such a party, this can only ever represent a critical support that aims to reach the base of such a party and bring it into opposition to its leadership by calling for the election of this party on the one hand, and on the other hand calling on the members or voters to put its leadership to the test in action, to lead a real struggle for their own reform demands. In this sense, the tactic of critical electoral support as a form of united front tactic necessarily begins with criticism of the non-revolutionary formations, which must be examined on the basis of their programme.
Today DIE LINKE is losing influence among voters. According to polls, only 3 to a maximum of 4% will vote for it in the European elections. At the same time, the exodus has so far failed to materialise. Although it has steadily shrunk in recent years, it still organises around 50,000 members – far more than the „rest“ of the left of the Left Party put together. On balance, it has even grown slightly since the departure of Wagenknecht and her allies.
We can certainly understand that class-struggle workers and left-wing activists are also voting for DIE LINKE in the European elections and even more so in the state elections in Saxony, Thuringia and Brandenburg in order to at least slow down a further shift to the right at the ballot box and also to express their rejection of the prevailing policies of the traffic light or the EU Commission. Many do this with little enthusiasm, but in the hope that DIE LINKE is at least a „lesser evil“ than all the other crap. Ultimately, this is also an illusion.
Ultimately, it doesn’t help that DIE LINKE is even shifting a little more to the left on domestic, social and anti-racist issues in the European election campaign and conjuring up its „opposition role“. However, the reformist heroes around Schirdewan, Rackete, Alev Demirel, Gerhard Trabert and Ines Schwerdtner are stuck halfway through. They are keeping a low profile on the issue of war. They play the pacifist card when it comes to Russia and Ukraine, while the motto regarding Palestine is to say as little as possible.
This makes party right-wingers like Klaus Lederer all the more vocal in their support for Zionism. It is not enough that people from the left wing such as DIE LINKE Neukölln and Mitte in Berlin or other organisations defend the Palestine Congress.
Of course, we can understand that many activists will vote for DIE LINKE despite all this – and we are quite prepared to take this step with them. We consider a campaign that focuses on abstention or even one-sidedly on not voting for DIE LINKE, as if there were nothing worse in June 2024, to be nonsensical. It is aimed at formations that have a more significant influence on the workers‘ movement, while so-called revolutionary groups – at best propaganda groups, not parties with any significant influence in the class – address their own base in the guise of revolutionary clarity and abstract propagandism to legitimise and at the same time isolate themselves.
Question to their left wing: regroup or hibernate?
But a few questions should be put to the left and militant comrades in the Left Party: How much longer do you want to perform the labour of Sisyphus of „Opposition” trying „reform“ a shrinking reformist party whose bureaucratic apparatus and leadership alliances you have not moved a single step to the left in the last almost 20 years? How much longer do you want to delude yourselves about a party where you may be winning new people for left-wing politics in individual places, but the party is not moving an inch to the left as a result?
Is it not time to consider whether your claim to advance class-struggle – indeed, in the case of organisations such as Socialism from Below, marx21, Sol or SAV, „revolutionary“ politics – can be realised in DIE LINKE? Is it not be high time, instead of spending years on political manoeuvres in a party that has not moved to the left even when it had more militant, left-wing layer – to enter into a systematic discussion with comrades inside and outside the party about building a real alternative to reformism?
We would not make resignation or an organisational break a precondition for this, but we consider it essential that the subjectively revolutionary and class-struggle left embark on such a discussion process with the aim of creating a common revolutionary organisation on the basis of a revolutionary programme. For the entire world-historical situation, crises, war, impending environmental catastrophe require a revolutionary response, not another „lesser reformist evil“.