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Pakistan: Revolution and Reaction

The struggle for the future of Pakistan continues apace. Bhutto and Musharraf still look to form a coalition government in the spring – despite the terrorist attacks on the PPP. The “war on terror” in the border regions threatens to turn into a full scale civil war. The masses desire democracy, agrarian reform and an end to the neoliberal offensive. In this joint resolution of the Revolutionary Socialist Movement and League for the Fifth International we analyse Pakistan’s revolutionary crisis and how it can be turned into a socialist revolution against capitalism and imperialism.

1. Pakistan has been through a tumultuous year of struggle. The military dictatorship led by General Pervez Musharraf has faced the most determined challenge to its rule since it seized power in 1999. On the surface Musharraf appears to have weathered the storm and won re-election from the provincial and national assemblies to extend his presidential candidacy to 2012. The representatives in these assemblies have been in office since 2002, when the military rigged the elections to ensure it had a majority.

2. Musharraf lacks even the most minimal democratic mandate but this does not mean he has no social support. He obviously has the enthusiastic support of major sections of the bourgeoisie, landowners and the middle classes, who have prospered in the boom years of recovery since the Asian crash. They see him as a barrier against the puritanical Islamists on the one hand and the working class on the other. But equally much of the bourgeoisie and middle classes feel excluded from the economic boom, as its benefits accrue to the corrupt friends of the military.

3. The USA has recently sharply expressed its dissatisfaction with Musharraf for his lack of vigour in prosecuting the “war against terrorism”, especially on the north west frontier with Afghanistan. However, the US has now rallied to him because of his recent military campaign in Waziristan and his attack on the Red Mosque. Washington has brought pressure to bear on Musharraf to cut a deal with Benazir Bhutto and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), historically the favourite of the USA and EU states.

4. At first it appeared Musharraf’s manauveurs had restored a temporary equilibrium in the political situation. The protests that followed the re-election of Musharraf as president were much smaller than the huge mobilisations of the summer. The masses that desire radical, democratic change in Pakistan face a profound crisis of leadership as Musharraf has won his reprieve only through negotiations with, and concessions to, the PPP. Despite the rhetoric of Nawaz Sharif, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) was only able to muster small protests when he attempted to return to the country, before being quickly deported again by Musharraf.

5. The PML-N and the other opposition parties walked out of the assemblies during the presidential votes leaving only the pro-Musharraf PML-Q and the PPP. The PPP were only present following last-ditch negotiations in London with the Pakistani military and abstained in the vote. The deal the PPP hoped to strike with the military had three core components: Musharraf was to resign as head of the armed forces; the constitution is amended to allow Bhutto to serve a third term as prime minister and to remove the power of Musharraf to dissolve parliament and; the dropping of corruption charges against Bhutto and other PPP officials.

6. The return of Bhutto saw hundreds of thousands mobilise in scenes reminiscent of her return in 1986 when the military regime was also under acute pressure. These mobilisations were marked by a suicide bombing of Bhutto’s motorcade that left 100 innocent people dead. This was a clear threat on Butto’s life. She and Musharraf have both been threatened with assassination by Jihadists. This attack is part of the growing civil war – mainly taking place in the border regions but including suicide bombings in the cities – between the pro-US bourgeoisie (military and PPP) and the Islamists. This conflict expresses an historic re-configuration of the balance of forces in Pakistani politics. Once, the military drew political legitimacy from Islamist forces and now that relationship – strained to breaking point by years of subservience to the Americans – has been shattered by the Red Mosque massacre. This is already creating fallout in the army and Inter-Service-Intelligence Agency (ISI) – as years of close links with radical Islamic militants have created a whole layer of officers politically sympathetic to them.

7. The deal between Musharraf and the PPP is still not complete. Nor is it clear that the Supreme Judicial Council will declare Musharraf’s re-election legitimate. Musharraf has thus far only promised to resign from the army and he stood for president when he was still “in uniform” i.e. head of the armed forces. Critically the Supreme Court has implicitly accepted that the existing provincial and national assemblies could re-elect him without new general elections.

8. This stance by the judiciary effectively completes the rapprochement between it and the military after the great polarisation, following Musharraf’s suspension of Chaudhry in March. Musharraf’s acceptance of the Supreme Court’s decision to re-instate Chaudhry went alongside his need to reach a deal with the PPP to stabilise his rule. Musharraf has now chosen his successor as military chief, the head of the ISI, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani. This makes the completion of the deal with the PPP almost certain, and reduces judicial recognition of Musharraf’s re-election to a virtual formality.

9. Kani is presented as not being one of Musharraf’s inner circle in order to create the impression that a degree of independence between the military leaders and the political establishment will now exist in Pakistan. Of course, this is a complete charade. Musharraf is a “military man” whether he is “in uniform” or not and the military will continue to pursue its interest aggressively in Pakistani politics. Indeed, the incoming PPP-Musharraf government is likely to continue the neoliberal economic policies and support for US imperialism of the Musharraf era.

10. The difference will be that PPP leaders will demand “their share” of the corrupt spoils of Pakistan’s government. The PPP, however, is not simply going into a double act with Musharraf. Bhutto is still his long-term rival and only a short-term ally. If she wins the election her democratic mandate will be far superior to that of the generals. As the recent mass demonstrations showed she still has credibility with the progressive masses (workers and students) and Musharraf will find himself much more hemmed in. Clashes between them are inevitable in the long, if not in the short, term. Testament to this was Bhuttos’ response to the recent suicide bombing as she blamed it, probably with some justification, on the sections of the military and ISI who continue to support the Islamists.

11. What do these developments mean for the crisis in Pakistan? The summer saw mass strike waves led by the bourgeois opposition parties. The movement heroically defended itself in four days of fighting following the attacks of the MQM in Karashi in May. This sparked a revolutionary crisis that was on a knife-edge. A decisive struggle by the movement towards a general strike and the arming of the people could have toppled the military regime while, equally, the military could have instigated martial law and imprisoned leaders of the opposition and even the judiciary.

12. As it turned out, Musharraf chose to make concessions to the PPP and the judiciary and to gain legitimisation from these forces by launching a war against the Islamic militants. The re-instatement of Chaudhry was a victory for the democracy movement but one that immediately split that movement; between liberals who believed the struggle was over (they had won) and radicals who wanted to continue the struggle and to overthrow the military. The move of the PPP towards sharing government with Musharraf is an act of complete treachery to the movement.

13. The contradictory and treacherous nature of the PPP position has already created anger and despondency in the eyes of millions of Pakistani and it is widely accepted that the PPP has “sold out”. The mass demonstrations on Bhutto’s return (and the bombing) illustrate the highly contradictory role the PPP now plays. The PPP has organised the protests bussing in peasants from the country side and offering limited but real financial rewards for attending. These mass demonstrations were a huge challenge to military rule – despite the accommodations made by the PPP. They indicate the continued, revolutionary character of the current crisis despite the relative stabilisation since the summer, which the PPP has made possible.

14. The suicide bombing by whoever it was (either a section of the military/ISI, Islamists or, most likely, some combination of the two) will only strengthen Bhutto’s image as an “opposition” figure and will put her in a stronger position to bargain with Musharraf. However, Bhutto and US imperialism have their eyes focused on a deal as this is the only hope they have to win a stabile, pro-American neoliberal government.

15. The force that appears to have the most to gain from the

PPP betrayal of the masses is the PML-N and its leaders have gone to great efforts to present themselves as the consistent democrats. However, Pakistan’s masses remember the attacks of the last Sharif government and know that this billionaire is part of a conservative, Islamist party and that he has neither the will nor the ability to lead a revolution on the streets – whatever he might claim. For this reason, the masses, in the absence of an alternative leadership, are likely to vote grudgingly for the PPP in the hope that this will bring democratic and social change.

16. Worker militants, anti-imperialist youth and radical lawyers will see the deal-making of Bhutto for what it is – treachery – and know that a Bhutto-Musharraf government will continue the neoliberal attacks of the last fifteen years and Pakistan’s bourgeoisie’s historic pro-imperialism. In this situation, the vanguard must quickly organise its forces into a new working class party and stand workers’ candidates against the PPP in the coming elections. The key tasks of revolutionaries, therefore, are to fight for the working class to break with the PPP, set about the formation of a working class party, and win it to a revolutionary socialist programme.

17. The leadership of the PPP has sought actively to turn the revolutionary situation of the summer towards a counter-revolutionary outcome – albeit one that will take a limited “democratic” form with the elections in January. However, this “democratic counter-revolution” will only be “complete” if the PPP wins the elections, shares executive power with Musharraf and wins victories over the working class on the economic terrain and the Islamists and tribal forces on the military terrain. Such an outcome faces major obstacles. The PPP and Musharraf’s military remain distinct ruling class factions pursuing different interests. The military will at all costs seek to uphold its political and economic power, while the PPP in government will seek to erode it in favour of its own sectional bourgeois interests. Both will actively court the support of Pakistan’s hugely powerful land owning families and US imperialism.

18. Additionally, as we have previously commented, there is a second form that the counter-revolution can take in Pakistan – the rise of the militant Islamists. We should remember that, in previous conflicts with the military, in 2003 and 2006, they have defeated them. They will be buoyed up by the further victories they will inflict on the Pakistani army in the border regions. They can pose as the “anti-imperialist” forces fighting the policies of Musharraf and the PPP both politically and militarily.

19. The conflict with the Islamists will inevitably intensify and offers the prospect of the “nightmare scenario” for US/UK imperialism of full-scale war spilling out from Afghanistan into Pakistan. Already, the US ruling class is preparing for this with presidential candidates warning Pakistan that they would be willing to take action against Islamic insurgents within Pakistan unilaterally. Any such move is certain to deepen splits in the ruling class and push further sections of the military towards the Islamists. Equally, Pakistan’s booming economy of the last five years – spurred on by Musharraf’s neoliberal attacks on the working class – will be hit by any slow down in the world economy, let alone world recession.

20. We recognise that the conflict being waged between the military and tribal/Islamist forces in the military is part of the reactionary “war on terror” – the drive for US domination of Asia and the Middle East. We give unconditional support for the military struggle of those opposing the imperialist occupation and their puppet-regime. However at the same time we have not an inch in common with the political program of reactionary Islamism. This is why we do not for a moment cease agitation for a full revolutionary programme. Equally we condemn all attacks by Jihadists on ordinary people and the PPP. Far from aiding the fight against the pro-imperialist politics of the PPP, such attacks are likely to strengthen them. They allow Bhutto to present the PPP falsely as a persecuted and radical political force.

21. The critical obstacle any Musharraf and PPP government faces is the working class and its organisations. The Pakistan working class has waged a series of struggles against neoliberalism throughout the Musharraf era. This year teachers, railway and Unilever workers have all been in struggles. The critical question is whether they can develop the political organisation – a revolutionary workers’ party – to link the struggle against neoliberalism with the struggle for workers’ power. It is, in short, only the working class that can solve the current crisis in a progressive, revolutionary socialist solution. The objective situation, with an intensifying civil war, rising workers’ struggles and the experience of this year’s mass mobilisations, makes the formation of a revolutionary socialist, vanguard party a real possibility in the months and years ahead.

22. The working class must be won to consistent and thorough going democratic demands. We must fight for the immediate resignation not only of Musharraf but the entire military regime. There must be immediate, fully democratic, elections to a sovereign Constituent Assembly (CA) – under the control of the workers peasants, and youth. In this process, the working class forces must not only fight for the workers’ rights and interests (minimum wages, shorter working week, work for the unemployed, etc) but also give a lead to the rural and urban poor, demanding that the Assembly addresses their economic and social demands (expropriation of big landowners and an end to the rule of their armed thugs in the villages, an armed peasant militia, land to those who work on it).

23. In addition, we fight for the CA to deal with the national question – the right to self-determination for all nationalities up to and including separation. Half the delegates to the CA should be women. All over 16 should have the vote and be eligible to stand as deputies. It should implement full and equal rights for women and young people in all areas of public and family life. It will fight for the separation of all religious bodies from the state and an end to any compulsion in the matter of sharia law.

24. If the working class makes itself the champion of democratic rights and the struggle against imperialism it can assemble a powerful alliance capable of disintegrating the social support of the bourgeois parties, the Islamists and the military coup makers. It can place on the order of the day the power of the workers and peasants, embodied in councils of their delegates, the overthrow and expropriation of the landlords, capitalists and generals and the complete destruction of the state apparatus through which they exercise their rule and, ultimately, serve the interests of imperialism. On this basis, a democratically planned economy can banish poverty and achieve equality and freedom. In short, we can make a socialist revolution that spreads to the surrounding states and places on the order of the day a socialist federation of South Asia.

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